|
United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, against post-revolutionary Iran, included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of dual-use technology, non-U.S. origin weaponry, military intelligence, Special Operations training, and direct involvement in warfare against Iran.〔〔 Support from the U.S. for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open session of the Senate and House of Representatives. On June 9, 1992, Ted Koppel reported on ABC's ''Nightline'' that the "Reagan/Bush administrations permitted—and frequently encouraged—the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq."〔 == U.S. reaction to the conflict == Diplomatic relations with Iraq had been severed shortly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. A decade later, following a series of major political developments, particularly after the Iranian Revolution and the seizure of embassy staff in the 1979–81 Iran hostage crisis, President Jimmy Carter ordered a review of American policy toward Iraq. According to Kenneth R. Timmerman, the "Islamic revolution in Iran upset the entire strategic equation in the region. America's principal ally in the Persian Gulf, the Shah, was swept aside overnight, and no one else on the horizon could replace him as the guarantor of U.S. interests in the region."〔Timmerman, Kenneth R. ''The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq''. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.〕 During the crisis, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of the disorder of the Revolution, the weakness of the Iranian military and the revolution's antagonism with Western governments. The Iranian military had been disbanded during the revolt and with the Shah ousted, Hussein had ambitions to position himself as the new strong man of the Middle East. "He condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and signed an alliance with Saudi Arabia to block the Soviet-backed attempt to take over North Yemen. In 1979 he also allowed the CIA, which he had once so virulently attacked, to open an office in Baghdad."〔Lando, Barry ''Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush'', Other Press, 2007.〕 Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, "began to look more favorably toward Saddam Hussein as a potential counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini and as a force to contain Soviet expansionism in the region."〔〔"Brzezinski maintained that with the right combination of blandishments, Iraq could be weaned away from Moscow. Encouraged by the suppression of the Iraqi Communist party, and perhaps believing that Iraq could, like Egypt after the October 1973 War, also be convinced to turn toward Washington, Brzezinski concluded that Iraq was poised to succeed Iran as the principle pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf. Although this notion remained very discreet for nearly a year, by the spring of 1980 Brzezinski and others in government and the media began to suggest publicly that Iraq was the logical successor to Iran as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. ... Indeed, in April, Brzezinski stated on national television that he saw no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq." Teicher, Howard. ''Twin Pillars To Desert Storm'', William Morrow and Company, Inc. New York, 1993.〕 The hint of change in the U.S. attitude toward Iraq was warmly welcomed in Baghdad ... Saddam Hussein believed that recognition by the United States of Iraq's role as a counter to radical, fundamentalist Iran would boost his ambition of becoming the acknowledged head of the Arab world. ... Saddam had an old score to settle with the Iranians over his southern border. He had never liked the agreement signed with the Shah in 1975. He felt confident he could regain the lost territory and probably topple the anti-American regime in Tehran by taking swift military action. He had no illusions that the United States would openly support the war he proposed to start. But getting rid of the Ayatollah Khomeini was clearly in the American interest, and in many other ways the United States and Iraq could benefit each other, Saddam believed. It was time to renew diplomatic relations with Washington and to move on quickly to more elaborate forms of strategic cooperation. p. 75 According to Zbigniew Brzezinski's memoir, the United States initially took a largely neutral position on the Iran–Iraq War, with some minor exceptions. First, the U.S. acted in an attempt to prevent the confrontation from widening, largely in order to prevent additional disruption to world oil supplies and to honor U.S. security assurances to Saudi Arabia. As a result, the U.S. reacted to Soviet troop movements on the border of Iran by informing the Soviet Union that they would defend Iran in the event of Soviet invasion. The U.S. also acted to defend Saudi Arabia, and lobbied the surrounding states not to become involved in the war. Brzezinski characterizes this recognition of the Middle East as a vital strategic region on par with Western Europe and the Far East as a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic policy.〔Brzezinski, Zbigniew. ''Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981'', Farrar Straus Giroux. 1983.〕 Second, the United States explored whether the Iran–Iraq War would offer leverage with which to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In this regard, the Carter administration explored the use of both "carrots," by suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iran upon release of the hostages, and "sticks," by discouraging Israeli military assistance to Iran and suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iraq if the Iranians did ''not'' release the hostages. Third, as the war progressed, freedom of navigation, especially at the Strait of Hormuz, was deemed a critical priority.〔 Although it is widely believed in the Middle East that the United States gave Saddam Hussein a "green light" to invade Iran, available evidence suggests that this allegation is completely lacking in foundation and also improbable due to the danger it would have presented for the American hostages still held in Iran. According to Iran expert Mark G. Gasiorowski and former CIA Middle East analyst Bruce Riedel, the lack of any diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq at the time would have made it difficult for the U.S. to convey any such message to Saddam's government, but if it had, "Saddam would not have listened." Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Thomas Pickering stated: "As opposed to 1990, there was no April Glaspie moment—there was no clear indication we know of from a reliable source that Saddam might have interpreted as a green light ... if there was such a moment, we should ask why the Iraqis didn't come forward and say 'Carter made us do it.'" Moreover, in 1979, CIA official George Cave led a mission to warn Iranian officials about U.S. intelligence regarding Iraq's preparation for an invasion. Although there is some evidence that Brzezinski may have seen the outbreak of the war as a pretext to justify increased U.S. involvement in the region, Gary Sick cites a declassified memo from Brzeinski to Carter that "argued for 'Iran's survival' and held out the possibility of secret negotiations with Tehran" as disproving "the unfortunate conventional wisdom that Brzezinski promoted the Iraqi invasion." Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani explained his view on the matter in 2008: "I have said before that I do not believe that America directly played a role in starting the war. I don't believe any sane person could possibly subscribe to this view. Rather, I believe that America was happy with the outbreak of war against Iran, and perhaps even played an indirect role in bringing it about." In sum, "The United States did not give a 'green light' to Saddam Hussein to attack Iran, contrary to prevailing opinion in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council, did, however, implicitly ratify the attack after the fact by refusing to condemn the Iraqis". 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|